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Marijuana Dog Searches After United States v. Unrue
By: Captain Frederic I. Lederer, J AGC, Instructor, Criminal Law Division, T J AGSA and
Second Lieutenant Calvin M. Lederer, MPjJAGC, Hofstra University Law School
It appears from field reports that the use of
Accordingly, an increasing number of Judge
marijuana detector dogs has become more
Advocates are encountering the numerous
commonplace throughout Army installations.
legal and practical difficulties connected with
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dog searches. In our first article 1 we discussed the nature of such searches and while
we briefly touched on the question of their
legal foundation we chose not to address ourselves in depth to the nature of the intrusion
itself.2 In view of the recent decision of the
Court of Military Appeals in United States v.
Unrue, 3 it now appears appropriate to examine
the nature of dog searches within the Fourth
Amendment context. Consideration of applicable civilian case law is essential to a proper
understanding of Unrue.
The threshold question within this area is of
course the very nature of the dog's intrusion.
In the use of a dog per se a search within the
ambit of the Fourth Amendment, and if so, is
it an unreasonable one? In the abstract a
strong case can be made that the use of a detector dog is not a "search." The supporting
argument would maintain that: firstly, the
presence of the dog as it is usually employed
(e.g., in barracks; at gates where vehicles
normally must pause) is not improper as long
as it remains in an area where there is a minimal expectation of privacy (e.g., the "common" areas of a barracks) ; and secondly, the
"operation" of the dog is not a search because
its detection of odors is the equivalent of
plain view (i.e., plain smell) 4 which is not
considered a search. 5 Thus a seizure would result without a constitutionally prohibited
search. This approach to the problem, while of
academic interest, appears to be of little value
to the practicing counsel in the field in light
of civilian precedents. The closest analogue
to the dog search seems to be the magnetometer "search" of airline passengers pursuant
to the anti-hijacking program. The basic content of the hijacking prevention program is
well known. Airline passengers who match a
secret physical and psychological profile are
noted.
All passengers will have their carry-on
hand baggage searched (physically and/
or by X-ray device) and will pass
through a metal detecting magnetometer.
Persons matching the profile who yield
positive magnetometer readings will be
searched. 6

While usually only those persons matching the
FAA profile are searched after a positive
magnetometer reading, it appears that the
profile "match" need not be a necessary prerequisite. Indeed, even the magnetometer
search has been held unnecessary by some
Circuits. 7 Most of the airline case holdings
have been based on implied consent of the
passengers and/ or the peculiar border-like
nature of the airline search. A number, however, have dealt expressly with the questions
of the nature and legality of the magnetometer search.
Without exception, those cases that have
dealt with the question 8 have held that the
magnetometer search is indeed a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The marijuana dog search is sufficiently similar to the magnetometer search that it would
be fruitless at this stage to argue another conclusion. What must then be considered is the
question of the search's reasonableness.
The principal civilian case on the subject is
United States v. Epperson. 9 In Epperson, the
defendant went through a magnetometer 10 at
Washington's National Airport. After the device gave a positive reading, the defendant
was searched. The search yielded a pistol. At
trial Epperson challenged the magnetometer
use alleging illegal search. The Fourth Circuit
held that the magnetometer was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment but
also held that it was a reasonable one that did
not require probable cause. After a discussion
of Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967) and TeTry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
the Court concluded that unusually pressing
circumstances (threat of hijacking), minimal
violation of privacy, and insufficient time to
obtain a warrant all compelled a holding that
the search was a reasonable one. Epperscm
was cited with approval by the Second Circuit
in United States v. Bezz.u In Bell, the Court
stated:
(the) contention of appellant that the use
of the magnetometer constituted an unreasonable search is baseless. None of the
personal indignities of the frisk discussed
by Chief Justice Warren in Terry . .. are
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here present. In view of the magnitude
of the crime sought to be prevented, the
exigencies of time which clearly precluded the obtaining of a warrant, the use of
the magnetometer is in our view a reasonable caution. 12
Judge Friendly, concurring, went a good deal
further, suggesting that a search designed to
prevent crime was clearly distinguishable
from a search designed to find evidence of
past-completed crime. The Third Circuit 13
has also followed Epperson, although attempting to limit its opinion somewhat more specifically to the hijacking context than have other
courts. The most recent case to present an indepth examination of the entire airport search
problem is United States v. Davis. 14 Davis,
unlike the previously noted cases, did not involve a magnetometer search, but rather a
simple search of the defendant's briefcase
which yielded a loaded gun. At trial Davis
moved to suppress the weapon. In an unusually lengthy and scholarly opinion the Court
rejected the Government's contentions that
the search could be justified either as a Terry
type frisk or because Davis did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect
to his carry-on luggage. The Court specifically
pointed out that even if Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz was accepted, 15 that did not
mean that "any kind of governmental intrusion is permissible if it has occurred often
enough." 16 Having rejected these arguments,
the Ninth Circuit used 17 the Supreme Court
cases on administrative inspections 18 to supply the proper standards for airport searches.
The court then stated:
The essence of these decisions is that
searches conducted as part of a general
regulatory scheme in furtherance of an
administrative purpose, rather than as
part of a criminal investigation to secure
evidence of crime, may be permissible
under the Fourth Amendment though not
supported by a showing of probable cause
directed to a particular place or person to
be searched.
The Court conceded that such searches would
detect contraband and lead to apprehension of
law violators but believed that this conse-

quence did not alter the essentially administrative nature of the screening process. The
Court strongly warned all concerned that if
the airport search were to be subverted into a
general search for evidence of any crime it
would exclude the proffered evidence. Davis,
like the other cited precedents, attempts to
walk a thin line clearly using a balancing test
with the threat of explosion 'and death sharply
tilting the scales.
To date four circuits, and possibly a fifth,t 9
have accepted the Epperson conclusion. The
marijuana dog search is sufficiently similar to
the magnetometer search to allow it to partake of the same rationale, if one makes tbe
basic assumption that the Army's drug problem approximates the hijacking threat. While
perhaps hard to accept, this proposition has
apparently been accepted by the Court of Military Appeals. 20 More importantly, the argument can be made that the use of a marijuana
detector dog which is primarily used against
property 21 represents a lesser intrusion into
an individual's privacy than a magnetometer 2 ~ which is used primarily to search the
person. 23 The lesser intrusion into privacy
may outweigh the smaller probability of immediate harm 24 caused by drugs.
Before turning to consideration of the military precedents, it is interesting to examine
the only civilian case that, to our knowledge,
has considered the use of marijuana detector
dogs. People v. Furman, 25 involved a confidential informant who supplied a U.S. Marshal with a tip that an individual of specific
description would attempt to leave the San
Diego Airport on a given flight to Portland,
Maine, and that he might possibly have drugs.
The information was transmitted to a state
narcotics agent who went to the airport at the
appropriate time. After verifying all of the
informant's specific information, the agent
had a marijuana dog borrowed from Customs
walk around in the airline baggage area. 26 The
dog alerted to a suitcase belonging to the defendant. The defendant was detained and the
dog alerted to a second suitcase he was carrying. The suitcases were then opened yielding

DA Pam 27-50-12
9

a total of 46 kilograms of man]uana. The
Court found that the dog's alert, when considered along with the informant's information, was enough to supply probable cause to
search. The Court stated:
Adequate foundation was laid establishing the reliability of Link (the dog) as
an investigative device. Evidence of
Link's high level performance and great
degree of accuracy in detecting marijuana odors justified reliance on Link's
reactions as corroboration of the informant's tip. Although we are aware of no
reported cases involving the use of dogs
as marijuana detectors, their use in
tracking fugitives has long been admissible in evidence to show an accused was
the doer of a criminal act .. .. The officers
as reasonably prudent men were justified
in the search and seizure. 27
Thus even if probable cause were to be required in dog searches (as indeed may be required in situations where regulatory type
searches are inapplicable) there is some civilian precedent for the dog's ability to supply
probable cause.
With the civilian cases as a proper foundation it is appropriate to turn to the military
case law. There is at present only one case on
point, Unrue. Arguably, however, a proper
understanding of Unrue requires an understanding of yet another military case, United
States v. Poundstone. 2B Poundstone involved
a U.S. base camp in Vietnam that was experiencing a serious narcotics abuse problem.
The battalion commander concerned ordered
a search of all battalion vehicles and accompanying personnel passing through the camp
gate. 29 Thus the commander intended to stop
the importation of drugs into his area. Poundstone was searched after the truck he was
riding in was stopped. Having been found to
have heroin in his pockets, he challenged the
'learch in court. The decision of the Court of
Military Appeals consisted of three individual
opinions. Judge Quinn's lead opinion contained the following language illustrative of the
entire opinion:
Whether denominated a search or an "administrative investigation," other types

of examination of the person or his property, although not based upon probable
cause, are not violative of the protection
against unreasonable search. . . . When
such action is "crucial part of the regulatory scheme" of a Government program and presents only a limited threat
to the individual's "justifiable expectations of privacy," the Government may
lawfully enter private property without
probable cause .... In every case of detention of person or property the standard of measurement of the Government's
action is the rule of reason. 30
Judge Darden limited his concurrence to gate
searches, stating, however, that "(t) his Court
has long recognized 'the commanding officer's
traditional authority to conduct a search in
order to safeguard the security of his command.' " 31 Judge Duncan, in dissent, suggested that the Court's opinion would not
allow servicemen a reasonable expectation of
privacy from inspection anywhere on an installation and that proof of military exigency
would not need to be shown according to the
majority's opinion. 32 The extent of the Poundstone holding is difficult to determine. The
case is too easily distinguishable from any
other set of facts, 33 and by traditional analysis much of the opinion can be branded
"dictum." Yet it clearly revealed that two of
the Court's judges preferred to expand the
traditional limits on inspections when dealing
with narcotics. With Unrue the Court's direction becomes clearer.
Unrue arose at Fort Benning. Because of
what was considered to be a serious drug
problem, the 197th Infantry Brigade set up
two mobile checkpoints within its area. At
the first point, drivers' licenses were checked
and the attention of vehicle occupants directed
to a sign reading, "Attention, narcotics check,
with narcotics dogs. Drop all drugs here and
no questions asked. Last Chance." An "amnesty" barrel was located under the sign. The
car in which Unrue was riding was stopped
at both points. At the second, a marijuana
detector dog was walked around the car. The
dog alerted and the passengers were apprehended, disembarked and searched. Heroin
was found in Unrue's wallet (vegetable mat-
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ter, presumably marijuana, was found underneath one of the car seats). The dog's alert,
according to lower Court opinions, was the
basis for finding probable cause to apprehend,
with the search of the person being based on
search incident to lawful apprehension. Unrue
is not a clear opinion. Judge Quinn, joined by
Judge Darden, first holds that a gate search
theory will not justify the search stating that,
even if a gate search is justified without probable cause, the road block did not constitute a
proper gate search. After finding that Unrue
did not consent to the search, Judge Quinn
holds that a commander may, in cases of "military necessity" (defined by the Judge as
whatever in light of all the circumstances is
reasonable) be required "to maintain regulatory systems which necessitate inspection of
persons and private effects without consent."
The types of military necessity, says Judge
Quinn, are searches to protect the security of
a command (he does not define "security")
and inspections to effectuate a proper military
regulatory program. In his view, the drug
problem at Fort Benning was ~ 4 so serious as
to constitute a serious threat to morale, capability, and health. Judge Quinn cites the antihijacking program for the proposition that
the number of instances of prohibited conduct
does not alone determine the degree of danger
and need and means to oppose it. In its later
paragraphs, the opinion suggests implied consent to the dog search because of the posted
notice. The Court discusses the use of technical devices to augment human senses assuming for purposes of the opinion that Katz prevents "Orwellian" surveillance using sophisticated technological devices. At the same
time, however, the Court seems to imply that
the detector dog is a proper augmentation or
extension of human senses.~" Abandoning the
discussion, Judge Quinn simply points out
(after having said that the use of the dog "to
detect odors ... that a human inspector could
not detect through his own sense of smell was
not unreasonable") that, in his opinion, by
the time Unrue's car reached the second checkpoint, "any justifiable expectation of privacy
as to odors emanating from it was just 'not of

impressive dimensions.'" Judge Quinn concludes, somewhat surprisingly, by citing our
earlier article as authority that the dog, having been proved capable, was sufficient to supply probable cause to search. The conclusion
is surprising in that the facts only show that
the dog supplied probable cause to apprehend.
The difference between cause to apprehend
and cause to search may be of little practical
importance, but constitutes slippage in an unsettled area of the law. The earlier part of
Judge Quinn's opinion would justify a regulatory search without dogs. Why then is there
the special effort to hold that the dogs may
supply probable cause? One possible explanation exists. The Court may have adopted the
same reasoning used in the airline search
cases discussed previously, making the decision that the drug problem approximated the
hijacking threat. Having accepted a balancing
test that weighs personal privacy against the
Government's interests in having combat
ready troops, the Court may be saying that,
in order to minimize the intrusion into personal privacy of the soldier, a dog that is sufficiently reliable to supply probable cause must
be used. Thus the Court would be sharply
limiting a rationale that would otherwise appear to allow virtually unlimited drug "shakedowns" in barracks and vehicles. If this is indeed the true holding of Unrue, the defense
counsel in a dog case must either contest the
existence of "military necessity," or must attack the dog's reliability or other facts of the
case. ~ 6 Query: Is the drug problem to be
judged by conditions Army-wide, installationwide, or unit-wide? What is the proper community?
What then of the barracks search for marijuana, or indeed for any contraband? As indicated previously there is authority in
Poundstone and Unr'lle for regulatory searches
designed to cope with problems that threaten
the unit's security or mission. Limiting Unrue
somewhat to its facts, the barracks search for
drugs using a sufficiently reliable dog appears
perfectly proper regardless of the barracks
configuration. At some point, however, we expect that the individual's expectation of pri-

1
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vacy will become paramount, and probable
cause will become necessary. For example, if
a commander suspects a specific individual of
drug abuse, there is no authority that we are
aware of which would allow a search of the
individual or his belongings without probable
cause (unless as in Furman the dog is properly in the area, in which case the "plain smell"
problem must be faced). While the search of
lockers seems justified, there is no way of
predicting just how far such preventive inspections may lawfully go unless PouncU3tone
is accepted without reference to its combat
setting. Unrue will allow stops and vehicle
searches by marijuana dogs on an installation
plagued by drug abuse, but what of vehicles
containing civilians? Should the status of an
individual matter? Are BEQ's or BOQ's qualitatively different from barracks? If not, what
of family quarters on post? Similarly, questions as to the necessity for commander's authorization to search (or judge's warrant)
arise. Inspections, depending upon regulation,
do not require probable cause or necessarily
specific authorization from a unit commander.37 Can a platoon sergeant expand the
traditionally informal "health and welfare"
inspection to include use of a marijuana dog
without his commander's express authorization? The answers are far from clear and
hopefully will not arise if commanders are
properly counseled by local judge advocates.

PO'und.stone and Unrue arguably represent
something new in military criminal law. While
they present problems far beyond the scope of
this article, they do suggest that evidence detected by dogs is here to stay. It will be for
later cases, military and civilian (including
the predictable federal habeas corpus petitions) to answer the questions raised within.
A trend in the law, military and civilian, appears to be taking shape. As the age of the
draft-free (perhaps publicity-free) modern
volunteer Army dawns, judge advocates have
no choice but to ponder the possible interpretations of "reasonableness" and "military necessity." Where indeed will "reasonable"
means 38 to search stop and 1984 begin? 39
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